Collegium must stand by and protect judges who walk the path of righteousness, Justice Datta said.
Justice Manmohan said that Courts are therefore not getting proper assistance.
The State, instead of acting as a model litigant, was the largest generator of litigation by filing routine appeals, she said.
The Supreme Court has observed that upon the death of a delinquent officer found to have amassed disproportionate assets, a confiscation proceeding under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009, can still be sustained against his wife, a non-public servant. A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh set aside the Patna High Court's judgment, which had declared the confiscation proceedings against the Respondent-delinquent officer's wife as abated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009, upon the death of his husband/delinquent officer. Disagreeing with the High Court's observation, the bench observed that when the initial case is registered under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 107 IPC (Abetment to Commit an Offence), then a confiscation proceeding can well proceed against the non-public servant even after the death of the delinquent officer. “(delinquent officer's) death would not let the respondent (wife) 'off the hook' since she had been proceeded against for holding the delinquent officer's, allegedly illegally begotten property right from the time that the authorities became alive to his alleged misdeeds. Still further, we may observe that it is a settled position in law that a non-public servant can be proceeded against when the initial case is registered under Section 13 of PC Act by virtue of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code.”, the court observed, referencing P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559. Background The case arose from vigilance proceedings initiated by the State of Bihar against Ravindra Prasad Singh, a government officer accused of amassing disproportionate assets between 1975 and 2009. Two FIRs were registered against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Indian Penal Code, alleging accumulation of illegal wealth worth over ₹12.96 lakh, along with multiple immovable properties and financial investments. Following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed in 2009. Subsequently, proceedings for confiscation of assets were initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009. Notices were issued not only to the accused officer but also to his wife, Sudha Singh, in whose name several assets were held. In 2013, the Authorised Officer ordered the confiscation of various movable and immovable properties, finding that the income and investments claimed by the wife, allegedly from stitching and tailoring work, were unsupported by credible evidence. The authority also noted non-compliance with service rules requiring disclosure of assets by the public servant. The confiscation proceedings were challenged by the deceased delinquent officer and his wife before the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the delinquent officer passed away, leading to the abatement of the confiscation proceedings by the High Court against the wife. Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the State of Bihar appealed to the Supreme Court. Decision Setting aside the impugned ruling, the judgment authored by Justice Karol observed that since the Respondent-wife was also issued the notice at the inception, alongside the delinquent officer, moreover, the Bihar Special Court's Act does not bar the action against any person holding property allegedly acquired through corrupt means, including family members, the confiscation proceedings can well proceed against the Respondent. “Section 15 BSCA itself provides that confiscation order be made after hearing the delinquent officer or any other person through whom the property or money in question is being held. When it provides that the other person in the equation can also be prosecuted insofar as the illegitimately procured property or money is taken away, the plain requirement is that at the time of initiation of the proceedings the person on whom proceedings under Section 13 of the PC Act are to be initiated, must be alive and noticed about such proceedings. The death of such a person does not extinguish the fact that confiscation order has been made after hearing the parties.”, the court observed. The Respondent supported the High Court's view, arguing that since the substitution of a legal representative is impermissible under the BSCA, the confiscation proceedings against her stand abated. Rejecting this argument, the Court observed, “such a submission is entirely misconceived for the respondent had also been put to notice right at the inception of proceedings along with the delinquent officer.” Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, restoring the Respondent's appeal to the High Court's file for adjudication on the merits. Cause Title: THE STATE OF BIHAR THR. VIGILANCE Versus SUDHA SINGH (with connected case) Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 Click here to download judgment Appearance: For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Azmat Hayat Amanullah, AOR Ms. Ekta Kundu, Adv. For Respondent(s) :Mr. Umesh Sharma, Adv. Mr. Peeyush Kaushik, Adv. Mr. Munish Kumar Gaur, Adv. Mr. Naved Anwar, Adv. M/s V. Maheshwari & Co., AOR Mr. Sumit Srivaastava, AOR
The States have been also asked to furnish steps taken to decongest prisons.
The Court quashed an FIR under the UP Gangster Act for procedural irregularities.
Invoking Art 142, the Court converted his plea for anticipatory bail into one for regular bail.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. A bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran was hearing a civil appeal filed by the Central Bank of India against a decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The Court noted that an application filed by the appellant seeking exemption from filing a certified copy of the impugned judgment. It found that there was a delay of 102 days in re-filing the appeal, yet the exemption application failed to disclose whether any steps had been taken to obtain the certified copy. In this context, the bench referred to Order XIX Rule 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and categorically observed that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the judgment under challenge. The Court also directed the registry to be mindful about the delay aspect while scrutinizing statutory appeals, which are to be filed within the prescribed limitation period. Following the direction in this case, the Supreme Court yesterday issued a circular clarifying that statutory appeals will not be entertained unless they are accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned judgment. "In pursuance of the directions issued in Civil Appeal D.No. 57050 of 2025 titled Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha & Others, dated 27.02.2026, all stakeholders are hereby informed that in view of Order XIX Rules 3 (2) read with 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, a Statutory Appeal cannot be entertained without accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment impugned therein. Henceforth, all such Statutory Appeals shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned judgment, for processing the matter further." Case : Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha & Others, Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273 Click here to read the order Click here to read the circular
The Supreme Court on Friday disposed of a petition seeking guidelines on the posting of images of accused persons by the police on their official social media accounts. The Court noted that in another recent PUCL case, directions were issued to the States to frame guidelines for media briefings by the police. The Court observed that those guidelines could cover social media postings as well. The Court therefore suggested that the petitioner await the outcome of the guidelines. Taking the Court's suggestion, Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, for the petitioner, withdrew the matter. A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul Pancholi heard the matter. During the hearing, Sankaranarayanan flagged the trend of police posting the images of accused persons being handcuffed, tied by ropes, paraded, forced to kneel etc. Apart from causing an affront to personal dignity, such images also add to the public bias against the accused, and can contribute to a social media trial, he argued. The petitioner particularly raised concerns over the social media accounts of Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Assam and Chhattisgarh police. These States were named as respondents. During the brief hearing, the bench discussed the risks posed by media trials and unregulated social media trends. Justice Bagchi observed that the present issue may require broader consideration extending beyond the immediate question raised in the petition. He explained: "We understand that police briefings to the media must be responsible and reasonable, and must not be exposed to bias, because in a criminal justice system, the investigating agency is neither pro-victim nor pro-accused." Justice Bagchi further highlighted the concern of police authorities getting carried away during media briefings and the emerging risks of media trials in pending criminal cases. He remarked: "It is the duty of the investigating agency to conduct an independent investigation to unravel the truth. To ensure that a balance is maintained, the manual is a very positive step. The manual will restrain the police from making over-enthusiastic statements which may be inferable with regard to matters that are subject to adjudication in a forensic and dispassionate manner. However, what happens when such an exercise, though restraining the police, is not able to remove the cloud or the vitiated atmosphere created through third-party indulgence, where sections of the media go on spinning narratives either way, resulting in a media trial that completely subverts the rule of law." Sankaranarayanan pointed out that the issue of "media trial" was first addressed by the Supreme Court in the Sahara v. SEBI decision of 2012. Justice Bagchi responded that the Sahara v. SEBI judgment was rendered in "more innocent times", as social media was not as prevalent then. The Chief Justice also remarked that nowadays, when people witness a road accident or see a person dying on the street, they are more likely to record the incident rather than assist the victim. In response, the counsel submitted: "My Lords know that if we attempt to draw the attention of the media to regulate themselves, it often leads to a conflagration. Your Lordships are aware that Article 19(1)(a) is immediately invoked." The bench observed that mainstream media is, by and large, acting responsibly, particularly since regulatory mechanisms such as the National Broadcasting Standards Authority are in place to oversee television channels. The Senior Advocate further submitted: "The problem today is that everyone who has a phone is effectively a media person. So how do we regulate that? Every person who is a witness can act as media, and then the situation gets out of hand. That is why the narrow focus of this petition is only on the police." The bench suggested that Sankaranarayanan consider expanding the scope of the matter to address the need for a coordinated mechanism involving all three stakeholders, namely the police, social media platforms, and the general public. Virtual Tabloids Acting As 'Blackmailers', Another Form Of 'Digital Arrest': CJI & SG Discuss When Solicitor General Tushar Mehta was asked to express his views, he stressed that the media "should not be irresponsible". He submitted that while mainstream media is generally regulated and accountable, certain virtual tabloids operating on digital platforms were acting as blackmailers. He stated: "The difficulty is that we have mainstream media which is, by and large, responsible. However, we also have tabloids operating solely on virtual platforms who function as blackmailers. In fact, calling them blackmailers may even be an understatement." The Chief Justice added that such acts of online blackmailing were, in his view, akin to a form of digital arrest, though the law does not presently recognise it as a specific penal offence. "If you ask me, it is another form of digital arrest, unfortunately still not being treated as a crime." Ultimately, the bench permitted the petitioner to withdraw the plea, granting liberty to file a fresh and more comprehensive petition addressing the broader issues discussed during the hearing. Case Details: HEMENDRA PATEL Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS| W.P.(C) No. 311/2026
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